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Municipal councils in Ontario are charged with the administration and control of organizations 
through the Municipal Act, 2001.  Councils are responsible for the financial and service 
performance of a wide variety of activities.  Should the activities and finances be poorly linked, 
this could lead to an accountability disconnect.  This research explores how well municipalities 
in Ontario link strategic planning to financial planning, and how they communicate this to the 
public.  Nine municipalities were randomly selected representing small, medium, and large 
municipalities in the south, central, and northern regions of the province.  Municipalities 
primarily rely on their corporate strategic plans and asset management plans to manage their 
initiatives and assets; these publicly available documents were used to evaluate connections 
between financial planning, strategic planning, and public communication.  Results indicate 
some level of maturation with strategic planning and financial planning, and clear public 
communication.  Only 56% of municipalities connected their budget to a strategic plan.  Loss 
aversion information was more frequently published (89%), explaining the individual financial 
impacts to stakeholders.  Regarding loss aversion, municipalities rarely published individualized 
gains to contextualize individualized losses or costs (33%).  In regards to this framing, a 
municipality’s ability to influence public opinion by publishing its performance is largely in its 
own hands. Pressure to satisfy the public may incentivize politicians to highlight ‘easy wins’ to 
sway overall public opinion.  Effective strategic planning linked to financial planning undermines 
these incentives by contextualizing strategic priorities using published goals and measuring 
progress.  
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Introduction 
Municipal councils in Ontario are charged with the administration and control of municipal 
organizations through the Municipal Act, 2001 (Ontario Municipal Act, 2001).  Management 
and control of organizations is about “steering organizations through the environments through 
which they operate, to achieve both short-term and longer-term goals” (Otley et al., 2014).  
Municipalities are created as “creatures of the province” to administer government services at 
a local level (Magnusson, 2005).  Across government and the private sector, financial 
performance of corporations is a common indicator of results (Stout, 2012).  If financial 
performance is not clearly linked to service delivery, how does that affect political and 
organizational effectiveness?  As per the Municipal Act (2001), the primary financial planning 
tool for local government is the budget, however many other acts have their own performance 
and reporting requirements.  This requires municipalities to submit over 225 separate reports 
annually to the province and regulatory bodies (AMCTO, 2017).   
As to municipal strategic planning, official plans are required to be maintained by every 
municipality to govern planning and development.  In comparison, budgets were designed for 
the management of public services, although influence from private business is common 
through the historical record (Rubin, 1993).  Budgets form the basis for allocating resources to 
deliver public services. Therefore, through that allocation, budgets determine strategic 
decisions, but do they supply enough information that can be used to hold leaders accountable 
for public services as well as public spending?   Since municipal councils’ responsibility is for 
service delivery while using finance as a tool to meet service delivery ends, financial resource 
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allocation decisions by municipal councils should be dependent on clear contextual information 
supplied alongside financial information.  This information is not required or is not required to 
be presented alongside budgetary information (Ontario Municipal Act, 2001).  While some basic 
contextual information is required after-the-fact through Financial Information Returns (FIR), 
the systematic disconnect between the plan (budget) and the actuals (FIR) lead to an 
accountability disconnect.  Without clear connections between strategic planning and financial 
allocations, budgets may act as a substitute for strategic planning with insufficient public 
transparency.    When financial information alone is provided with little context during public 
debates or discussion, municipal councils’ performance management of their organization via 
the budget process may have unintended consequences. Gabris (1992) posited that 
“rationalistic” strategic plans don’t necessarily mesh with “incremental” characteristics of 
municipal budget systems, but the reality may not be that black and white.    Effective strategic 
planning should link plans to resources. This research will explore the following research 
question: 
 
How well do municipalities in Ontario link strategic planning to financial planning, and how 
do they communicate this to the public?  
 
This question has great significance to the over-all intention of budget as a performance 
management tool for Ontario municipalities.  While municipalities may have performance 
measurement and management systems for few or many of their public programs, if they are 
not closely tied to performance indicators in the budget process, councils will not have the 
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appropriate frame of reference to allocate resources and manage outputs or outcomes of 
public programs.  If there are complaints that the municipality is not meeting the goals of its 
strategic plan, does that mean that the budget is not being spent? If this strategic and financial 
information is presented to council but is not laid out clearly for the public, then the public will 
be unable to ascertain if the financial allocations meet their needs and desires.  This potential 
disconnect between financial and service performance also clouds political accountabilities as 
the connection between financial performance, service performance, and political will or vision 
is weak.   In the broader business sense, this disconnect has been identified repeatedly by 
others (Drucker, 1954; Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Fitzgerald, 1988; 
Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), and would provide greater accountability when applied to 
municipal politics.   
 
As we explore the topic further, it is important to have a common understanding of terms.   
Performance Measurement Systems (PMeS) and Performance Management systems (PMaS) 
will be frequently referenced in this research, and can have significant differences in meaning.   
Performance Measurement Systems are typically used to develop comparability within and 
between businesses and time periods.  The term can be quite broadly applied, leading to 
uncertainty of the meaning in each specific context (Franco-Santos et al, 2007).  Based on 
Franco-Santos et al.’s systematic literature review in 2007, they developed a set of key 
categories to define performance measurement systems’ role, including specific conditions 
within which they operate: 
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(1) “measure performance” - This category encompasses the role of monitoring progress 
and measuring/evaluating performance;  
(2) “strategy management” - This category comprises the roles of planning, strategy 
formulation, implementation/execution, and organizational alignment;  
(3) “communication” - This comprises the roles of internal and external communication, 
benchmarking and compliance with regulations;  
(4) “influence behaviour” - This category encompasses the roles of rewarding or 
compensating behaviour, managing relationships, and control; and  
(5) “learning and improvement” - This comprises the roles of feedback, double-loop 
learning, and performance improvement. 
 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009), as well as others (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 
2008), define performance management systems as a broad set of management control 
mechanisms used by leaders and employees with the overall purpose of facilitating the delivery 
of organizational goals by influencing people’s behaviour and performance.  For the purpose of 
this study, any reference to Continuous Improvement and Continuous Quality Improvement 
Programs are contained within the definition of PMaS.  PMaS were previously known as 
management control systems, which focused mostly on financial and budgetary controls 
(Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999).  Examples of a PMaS would include a work 
measurement system, work priority management system, or worker reward system. 
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In the municipal democratic context, the 5 key categories of “measure performance, strategy 
management, communication, influence behaviour, and learning and improvement” all closely 
relate to public perception of what a city delivers to its citizens.  This brings us to the idea of 
public value.  Public value describes the value that an organization contributes to society, in a 
broader sense than shareholder value alone which primarily focuses on financial returns 
(Friedrich & Eerma, 2018; Moore, 1995).  To contextualize the cost-benefit of taxation and fees 
against municipal services, it is in a municipality’s best interest to demonstrate the value that 
citizens and others receive in exchange for their financial contributions.  While it is simple to 
compare tax burdens, fee structures, and other financial tools over time and across 
jurisdictions, public value lies in the eyes and mind of the citizen.  Values are highly variable 
between individuals, cultures, and communities, demonstrating the need to develop a public 
value proposition with broad public appeal and common understanding.  
 
When considering municipal resource allocation and the determination of public value, there 
may be side effects or unintended consequences of any particular set of decisions or actions.  
Baert (1991, p.201) defines unintended consequences as “a particular effect of purposive action 
which is different from what was wanted the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of 
which was a reason for carrying it out.”  It is not clear in the original definition that a purposive 
action may have more than one effect, but it is assumed for the purpose of this research that 
an action may produce more than one effect.  For example, a particular action measured and 
managed in a PMaS may produce the intended outcome as well as an unintended outcome.  
Baert (1991) explains that most research equates unintended consequences with 
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unanticipated, unforeseen, or unexpected effects.  It is important to note that unintended 
consequences can be positive, negative, or neutral in comparison to the intended 
consequences.  
Municipal Performance Management: Contextual Analysis 
Municipalities in Ontario are legally created by the province and enabled through the Municipal 
Act, 2001.  As ‘creatures of the province’ (Magnusson, 2005), these municipal corporations are 
accountable to the province for their performance in a hierarchical sense.  However, since 
municipalities have their own elected officials and their own legal identity as a corporation, that 
accountability link is primarily at the local level.  The Municipal Act (2001) is designed as 
enabling legislation, empowering municipalities to the activities as outlined in the act.  In 
section 23.3, the act outlines powers that cannot be delegated, which includes the power to 
adopt and amend the budget of the municipality, while subsection 2 clarifies that nothing in 
23.3(1) prevents a municipality from delegating its administrative powers.  This fundamentally 
separates a municipal council’s financial accountability from service delivery.  As an example of 
provincial oversight, the province of Ontario operated the Municipal Performance 
Measurement Program, starting in the early 2000s and ending in 2014, during a time where 
performance management in municipalities was growing (Melkers & Willoughby, 2005).  This 
mandatory program provided base level data for the public and the province to compare costs 
for service.  Even with this pan-municipal performance measurement system, the 
measurements were heavily weighted in financial terms:  
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Table 1: Relative Types of Ontario MPMP Indicators 
 Count of Standard Indicators % of total 
MPMP Numerical or unit 
Measures 
57 37.5 
MPMP Financial Measures 83 54.6 
MPMP Relative (%) Measures 12 8 
 
In the international context, a growing number of cities are subscribing to the ISO 37120: 2018 - 
Sustainable Cities and Community standard.  This international standard allows the systematic 
comparison of performance metrics for municipalities and communities world-wide, with the 
majority of indicators being non-financial, focusing instead on service delivery and quality of life 
(ISO, 2020).   
 
Considering the shift to a broader scheme of performance standardization introduced by the 
ISO 37120 standard and the individual’s right to choose their leadership as espoused through 
the Charter of Rights & Freedoms, let us discuss the forces at work in personal choice and 
behavioural economics.   
Behavioural Economics 
Beyond systemic variances innate to PMaS theoretical foundations, municipal decisions made 
by council are subject to the individual human strengths and frailties of each individual 
municipal councillor and administrator.  Aside from political pressures that may compete with 
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rational decision making, decisions are also subject to human biases that decision makers may 
or may not be aware of as an individual or group.  Consideration must be given to behavioural 
economics in the municipal context.   
 
In any institution, behavioural economics will be influenced by habits, routines, and customs of 
actors, with their decisions being framed within their abilities and environment (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996).  Social rewards for following institutional patterns of decision making may beget 
similar decisions as those made in the past.  In contrast to the simplicity and scientific rigour of 
managing through detailed performance metrics, decision makers in municipalities may benefit 
from being aware of the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.  According to their work, 
actors may not behave as neoclassical economists may predict; individuals are not necessarily 
rational and self-interested. Assumptions made about the rationality of actors framed by utility 
theory does not fit well for all decision-making processes.  There are additional factors to 
consider other than maximization of utility, such as benefits gained through cooperation – a 
critical consideration in the democratic context. In addition, errors in perception or recollection 
of events may induce errors in decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).  As municipal 
politicians consider a multitude of factors during budget deliberations and/or strategic 
planning, these effects, social rewards, and errors may influence choices or allocations.   
 
For example, Rick (2011) explores the phenomena of loss aversion.  Humans commonly 
evaluate losses and gains asymmetrically, leading to reduced rationality when decision making.  
The gain or loss scenario, the order in which the pros and cons are considered, and the feeling 
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that losses are felt more than comparable gains, all factor in when an individual is considering 
gaining or losing an item or service.  He observes that ownership itself has inducement towards 
liking, and losses may be experienced more acutely than gains (Rick, 2011). 
 
These irrational behaviours were further explored by Kahneman & Tversky (1996) considering 
actors’ heuristics and biases.  The heuristics and biases approach they developed suggests that 
human judgements are often affected by ‘judgemental heuristics’ such as the availability 
heuristic (how easily an event comes to mind represents the frequency that this event 
happens), the representativeness heuristic (“the degree to which [an event] 1- is similar in 
essential characteristics to its parent population, and 2- reflects the salient features of the 
process by which it is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972)).   Beyond individual heuristics, 
societal norms also provide a framing and relatively common set of values or judgements 
affecting gains and losses or other norms.  These norms affect naturally intuitive predictions of 
event probability, leading to significantly under-rated or neglected risks by actors and decision 
makers, whether they are leaders or voters.  
 
When we consider these mental short-cuts combined with the relatively short event horizon 
that the fixed 4-year election cycle creates, how do municipalities assess their environment and 
take calculated risks of benefit to the community? Thaler et al. (1997) explored “myopic loss 
aversion,” that is an observed tendency for actors to be more sensitive to losses than to gains, 
as well as a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently using mental accounting. Mental 
accounting is a cognitive activity that people use to aggregate how transactions are grouped 
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temporarily and cross-sectionally; this mental accounting frames decision making.  Loss 
aversion explains the phenomena that people tend to be more sensitive to decreases in their 
wealth than to increases, with losses weighted about twice as strongly as gains.  In order to off-
set these perceived losses to tax payers, must municipalities be able to demonstrate their 
services are twice as valuable as the tax dollars paid?  
 
Exploring this temporal risk aversion heuristic further, Tversky & Kahneman (1991) identify that 
choice depends on a status quo or reference level of actors.  In scenarios where the reference 
point is changed, preference order may be reversed.  A central assumption of this theory is that 
losses or disadvantages will have a greater influence than gains or advantages will.  This 
“reference dependence” means gains or losses are only calculated to a relative reference point.  
“Loss aversion” was previously referenced, and “diminishing sensitivity” means that the value 
of gains or losses decreases with size or impact.  Note this has an asymmetric value/gain curve; 
this observation begs the question: is loss aversion irrational? The value function of the 
asymmetry between gains and losses points to three observations: 
1) “organisms habituate to steady states” 
2) “marginal response to change diminishes” 
3) “pain is more urgent than pleasure” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
 
Knowing these evaluations of gains and losses are frequent during resource allocation 
(budgeting) processes, how do decision makers maximize their decision outputs to generate 
public value?  Khalil (2013) reviews two types of maximization based on an individual’s beliefs.  
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If the objective or intent is wellbeing, then beliefs are practical; if the objective is truth, then 
beliefs are scientific.  Khalil observes that rational choice theory has not addressed these 
differing belief frameworks.  If an agent makes an ‘error’ in a scientific belief framework, their 
decision should not be considered irrational, as they are making a rational decision and 
maximizing their practical wellbeing and not truth.  Actors do not necessarily work only within 
one framework; utility may not be the ultimate or only guiding influence.  For example, would 
the quest for truth be substituted for safety if the relative costs change? How do agents deal 
with the relative cost of competing choices as they form their belief? Khalil (2013) reviews 
three choices that actors must face:   
1. Rational choice 
2. Heuristics, and  
3. Biases.  
Considering Khalil’s analysis (2013), we must acknowledge that municipal decision makers have 
limits to their rationality and computational power, leaving us with Herbert Simon’s notion of 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1957; Heukelom, 2009).  We can expect municipal decision 
makers to behave in a rational manner within their specific context and within their abilities.   
Some of the previous transactional examples on loss aversion may not translate well to non-
purchase type decisions; this is where Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler’s further work on the 
“endowment effect” fits well.  In the context of the endowment effect, the carriers of utility 
(municipal service delivery) are not ‘owning’ or ‘not owning’, but rather they monitor or 
manage a change in state – interpreted as a loss or gain.  As losses are typically weighted 
heavier than gains, this therefore has an influence on ‘mental accounting’ balance.  Errors or 
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‘illogicities’ also creep into decision making when actors neglect to treat money as fungible 
(Kahneman et al, 2004).  Complicating things further, observers may use a different framework 
of analysis from decision makers regarding objectives of truth and wellbeing.   
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) highlight the challenges in evaluating decision alternatives in 
uncertain environments in their development of prospect theory.  They observe five 
phenomena of choice that violate the traditional view of expected utility theory:  
1. Framing effects: variations in framing affect preferences. 
2. Non-linear preferences: utility of risky prospects is non-linear; perception of probability 
affects observed preferences. 
3. Source dependence: willingness to bet on uncertain events depends not only on degree 
of uncertainty but on source.  
4. Risk seeking: risk aversion is generally assumed except in the following observed 
examples such as actors may prefer a small probability of winning a large prize over the 
expected value of that prospect. Also, risk seeking is common when actors must choose 
between a sure loss and a probability of a larger loss. 
5. Loss aversion: losses loom larger than gains.  Asymmetry between gains and losses is 
too extreme to be explained by income effects or decreasing risk aversion. 
 
Classical utility theory would posit that the utility of an uncertain prospect would be the sum of 
the utility’s outcomes, weighted by each probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  However, 
utility theory does not consider fully the environment within which the actor makes their 
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decision.  Tversky & Kahneman (1992) develop prospect theory to address this issue with two 
phases:   
1. Framing: the decision maker constructs a representation of the acts, outcomes, etc. 
2. Valuation: the decision maker assigns value to each prospect and chooses accordingly. 
They expand our understanding of value by using prospect theory to identify the following 
characteristics of value:  
1. Value is carried by gains and losses, not final assets. 
2. Value of each outcome is modified by a weight, not an additive probability. 
According the second characteristic above, actors have a mental weighting applied to their 
value of each potential outcome; Tversky & Kahneman observe that the principle of diminishing 
sensitivity applies to weighting of outcomes – the key reference point is the boundary 
determining gains from losses.  “Evidence indicates that human choices are orderly, although 
not always rational in the traditional sense of the word” (Tverskey & Kahneman, 1992, p. 317).  
So how does this understanding of prospect theory affect municipal resource allocation? First, 
let us examine other potentially unintended consequences.  
Unintended Consequences 
While specific study of unintended consequences in performance management is limited, there 
is a growing body of research on behavioural economics which sheds light on “goal-oriented 
action” and “the science of the unexpected.”  Consider the ratchet effects of performance 
restriction as described by Charness et al. in 2011.  In general, service providers may restrict 
outputs if increased outputs will increase future output expectations.  While municipalities may 
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have internal performance systems to manage inputs, outputs, and outcomes, if there is public 
transparency to the process, administrators may restrict outputs to manage future expectations 
(Arce et al., 2017; Cardella & Depew, 2018).  While there is evidence that the management 
skills of top management teams have a strong influence on the performance of municipal 
organizations (Carmeli, 2006), public transparency levels will influence performance ratchet 
effects. 
The positive impacts of performance measurement have been studied with a focus on strategic 
alignment, communication, corporate control, or accounting performance.  However, far fewer 
studies have identified common negative impacts (Franco-Santos et al., 2018, p.696).  A few 
studies have identified common negative side effects, including measure fixation, myopia, 
gaming, or manipulation of data (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Smith, 1995a).   Should the 
unintended negative consequences not be considered, systematic disadvantages may outweigh 
the advantages or may introduce other undesirable outcomes.  Let us consider theory 
developed by Monica Franco-Santos and David Otley (2018) and others, and test these 
assumptions against the realities of the Ontario municipal context.  Based on the literature and 
theoretical development performed by Franco-Santos et al (2018, p. 697), undesirable 
unintended consequences are more likely to happen when systems are designed using false 
assumptions about behaviour and the likelihood of uncertainties.  Assumptions are not 
necessarily conscious decisions, but may be due to ignorance, errors, self-fulfilling forecasts, 
immediate short-term concerns, or variances in ideology.  These assumptions become part of 
the performance measurement and management tool and may change outcomes by altering 
social relationships or modifying information that is used for decision making.  These variations 
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may cause unintended consequences whose costs are greater than the benefits. Franco-Santos 
et al. (2018, p. 697) identify three impacts that their theoretical work has on existing research:  
1. Provides words of caution regarding uncritical adoption of agency theory assumptions 
when designing PMSs, 
2. Contributes to previous performance management contingency research providing 
additional evidence regarding the importance of ‘fit’ between control mechanisms and 
their environment, and 
3. Study enriched understanding of the effectiveness of PMaSs by illuminating the reasons 
why unintended consequences may occur, so they can be minimized, although never 
eliminated. 
 
Based on the literature review, this study will focus on testing whether budget documents 
provide contextual performance information so the most common unintended consequences 
of performance management can be avoided in Ontario municipalities (Franco-Santos et al., 
2018).   
Performance Management Systems 
Common Assumptions 
Franco-Santos et al. (2018, p. 700) identify several common assumptions in performance 
management systems: 
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• Each control system or subsystem is considered a PMaS in its own right (Ferreira and Otley, 
2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1999). 
o Subsystems are often designed by different people and at different points in 
time. 
o Subsystems often work differently within different organizational functions and 
at different hierarchical levels. 
o These separate or differing systems are assumed to act in a coordinated way to 
help the organization attain its goals (although this is rarely achieved in practice 
according to Otley (2016)). 
• Control mechanisms are understood to be connected to each other in different ways. 
o According to Weick (1976), these systems could be considered to be ‘tightly’ or 
‘loosely’ connected to each other. 
o Some connections could have causal relationships. 
• PMSs are constantly evolving, including the evolution of control mechanisms and system 
elements. 
• Control mechanisms for a PMS can be formal or informal. 
o Formal control mechanisms include tangible objects that can be controlled and 
changed. 
o Informal controls include less tangible social factors that could include peer 
pressure, social routines, or other phenomena that are more difficult to 
investigate and change. Franco-Santos (2018, p.700) notes that there is a general 
understanding in literature that the unintended dysfunctional effects of formal 
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controls can be mitigated by the use of informal means, despite little explanation 
of the observation.   
• PMSs are built on implicit or explicit mental models that predict likely outcomes (Otley and 
Berry, 1980).   
o Operational actors or managers may have important distinctions in their mental 
models, and therefore could use control mechanisms differently. 
o Designers’ models are often based on assumptions about people, systems, and 
environmental conditions, as well as the control mechanisms that best suit the 
organization’s drivers of success. 
 
Franco-Santos et al. (2018, p. 701) identify three theories with a primary influence on PMaSs.  
These three theories provide a foundation for the creation and management of PMaSs, and 
testing the prevalence of these theories will provide a context for analysis. The three 
foundational theories are as follows:  
• Contingency theory of accounting (Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Weick, 1989) 
o This theory posits that control mechanisms are most effective when tailored to 
fit specific circumstances, not universally applied. 
• Agency theory (Eisenhard, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
o This theory posits that organizations seek to meet the expectations of their 
owners, and that employees are self-serving, opportunistic, effort-averse, and 
risk-averse.  To mitigate these self-interests, agency theory applies monitoring 
systems with explicit goals and performance measures that provide information 
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used to assess employee behaviour and the results of their actions; incentive 
systems can be used to leverage self-interest and encourage employees to focus 
on the organization’s goals.  
• Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012) 
o This theory is also used to explain the same choice, use, and consequences of 
control mechanisms but suggests that the assumptions of agency theory are too 
restrictive and reliance on the restrictive assumptions causes could lead to 
undesirable consequences.  This theory’s main assumption is that organizations 
often have multiple and complex goals, employees can act as stewards, and can 
have a shared sense of responsibility with multiple stakeholders.  This theory 
relies on the assumption that uncertainty is the natural state, and monitoring or 
incentive controls may undermine the stewardship of the employees.  This 
theory is viewed as being ‘enabling’ rather than Agency theory’s ‘directive’ 
approach (Franco-Santos and Doherty, 2017) 
 
Waddington (2016) identifies research coming from sociology with a focus on ‘unrecognized, 
unintended, and emergent consequences of goal-oriented action” while Portes (2000) reviews 
the ‘science of the unexpected’.  Fundamental to this discussion the definition of unintended 
consequences.  Baert (1991, p. 201) defines them as “a particular effect of purposive action 
which is different from what was wanted the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of 
which was a reason for carrying it out”.  The term ‘purposive action’ was originally used by 
economists and politicians (Smith, 1759) but was popularized by Merton (1936).  It is not clear 
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in the definition that a purposive action may have more than one effect, but it is assumed for 
the purpose of this research that an action may produce more than one effect.  
Systematic Assumptions 
Baert (1991), Mica et al (2011), Merton (1936) and Franco-Santos et al. (2018 p.702) identify 
the following shared assumptions in research and theorization in regard to unintended 
consequences:  
• There is a ‘recognized intention’ by the primary actor. 
• Any ‘purposive social action’ will unavoidably have unintended consequences, irrespective 
of whether they are beneficial or detrimental.   
• There is an assumed spectrum from unintended-functional to unintended-dysfunctional for 
all possible unintended consequences. 
• Unintended consequences may be minimized but never completely eliminated. 
• Some unintended consequences may be expected by actors, other consequences not.  
• Minimization of the undesirable consequences must be theorized and managed to prevent 
a PMaS backfire.  
 
Merton (1936) identified five factors that could limit the actors’ ability to anticipate 
consequences of their actions:  
• Lacking knowledge or ignorance of knowledge they possess, 
• Appraising current and future situations incorrectly, and therefore affect action choice, 
• Weighting short-term consequences heavily, over long-term consequences, 
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• Fundamental values may justify necessity of actions, and 
• Preconceived ideas concerning possible outcomes affect judgement (or self-fulfilling 
prophecy). 
Elias (1997; 1998) tied these limiting factors together under an umbrella argument, explaining 
that unintended consequences are the result of existing social relationships.  When social 
relationships are complex, each actor would have a limited understanding of the whole 
environment and therefore actions based on this incomplete knowledge could have unintended 
consequences (Mennell, 1977). This study will gain insight into these effects by examining 
specific examples of unintended consequences through systematic review.  
Common Unintended Consequences 
This study will work within Franco-Santos et al.’s (2018) framework of the most commonly 
experienced unintended consequences of PMaSs and their causes, as described in their 
literature review.  The authors note that the framework primarily identifies unintended 
consequences of a negative or dysfunctional nature, and that any positive or functional effects 
have been largely overlooked in existing research.  In addition, most research focuses on the 
review of directive control measures endorsed by agency theorists such as Eisenhard (1989) 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976).   Little study has been done on stewardship-based PMaSs 
where the enablement of actors is the focus.  Franco-Santos et al. (2018) distills five categories 
of unintended consequences in PMaS systems:  
• Directive PMaSs encourage strategic behaviour or gaming in individuals, potentially 
breaching ethical norms.  
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• Directive PMaSs are associated with information manipulation used to meet performance 
targets. 
• PMaSs can generate ‘selective attention’ both in what is measured and the timing of 
measurement.  PMaS changes managers’ focus to short-term objectives (myopia) rather 
than actions that may have greater long-term benefits.   
• Directive PMaSs can create an illusion of control, increasing belief in assumptions of 
performance rather than actual performance. 
• Directive and enabling PMaSs commonly alter social relationships within organizations. 
Directive systems can promote transactional relationships and erode trust.  Enabling 
systems can reduce mistrust and corruption.   
Other unintended consequences can include: increased managerial time cost for PMS (Cox, 
2005), movement away from professional values or standards (Tan and Rae, 2009), decreased 
well-being or morale (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002), stifling of innovation (Lindsay et al., 2014), 
and inequalities (Cuguero-Escofet and Rosanas, 2016).  Franco-Santos (2018) notes that a 
significant amount of research into dysfunctional effects in PMS has been done in public sector 
organizations and the majority of consequences were deemed to be perverse.  In the for-profit 
sector, the studied unintended consequences seem to be more aligned with strategic behaviour 
including information manipulation and short-termism or myopia (Healy, 1985). 
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Cause and Effect: Outcomes of Performance Management Systems 
Unintended Consequences in Performance Management Systems 
Franco-Santos (2018) identified three most common causes of unintended consequences in 
PMaSs:  
• Managers perceive increased performance pressure (Li, 2015; Merchant, 1990). Increased 
performance pressure increases potential for negative behaviours, which may be 
internalized or rationalized and lead to decreased trust in social interactions.  Based on 
agency theory, directive PMaS controls send a message to employees that they cannot be 
trusted.  Based on this influence, employees trend towards opportunistic behaviour 
(Cardinaels and Yin, 2015) and therefore influence social norms in the same direction.  In 
mission-focused entities, professional values dominate (steward rather than self-interest) 
while theories of behaviour, relationships, and complex contextual factors can cause direct 
controls to tend towards negative outcomes (Chwastiak, 2006; Kerpershoek et al., 2016; 
McCann et al., 2015).   
• The specific design or use of PMaS (Hopwood, 1972; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012) can 
lead to unintended consequences. For example, the link between performance 
measurement and rewards is a critical choice, as actors’ sense of gain or loss can lead to 
strategic behaviour, coordination effects, collaboration issues, and negative social dynamics 
(Lowe and Shaw, 1968). 
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• Environmental complexity (Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012; Cox, 2005) can also lead to 
unintended consequences.  Managers’ uncertainty in complex systems may lead them to 
react to financial pressures by gaming the system (Merchant, 1990).  Continuous change in 
leadership can create increased uncertainty and increased opportunities for gaming 
(Berliner, 1956).  Highly regulated and complex environments such as hospitals or airports 
provide more opportunities for side effects in directive PMaS environments.  Finally, some 
researchers found that underlying assumptions about human behaviour cause unintended 
consequences (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Franco-Santos et al., 2017).   
Testing A New Theory of Unintended Consequences in Performance 
Management Systems 
Franco-Santos et al (2018) proposed new theories that could govern management of 
unintended consequences in PMaSs:   
• “An identified set of ideal PMaS types will maximize the fit between the chosen control 
mechanisms and the existing organizational conditions:” 
o Fit is best determined by careful design of ‘purposeful actions’ (Merton 1936) in 
the PMaS. 
o Organizations have a variety of control mechanisms available to them (Bedford 
et al 2016) with a directive or enabling focus. 
• Goal alignment and goal uncertainty 
o Managers choose controls using two factors: they make assumptions about the 
level of goal alignment, and also about goal uncertainty (Broadbent and Laughlin 
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2009). Franco-Santos et al. (2018) proposed a framework for the management of 
unintended consequences based on the understanding of goal-alignment and 
the environmental characteristics affecting goal uncertainty (see proposed 
framework in Figure 1).  In this model, when managers assume that workers act 
opportunistically (goal alignment) and when they are less certain about 
outcomes (goal certainty), PMaS actions aligned with agency theory (directive) 
will prevail.  In situations where there is high goal certainty and high goal 
alignment, enabling PMaS systems will emerge aligned with stewardship theory. 
Although agency and stewardship approaches are not mutually exclusive 
(Franco-Santos et al. 2014), exploring how municipalities use these systems is 
related to this research.  Much of the existing research on PMaSs focuses on 
agency-based systems, but organizations with complex goals, such as 
municipalities, will endure problems under agency-focused PMaS (Franco-Santos 
et al. 2018).  This research is aligned with contingency research (Chenhall 2003; 
Otley 2016) which explains how appropriate controls are unlikely to be universal; 
different circumstances may require different controls.   
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Figure 1: Franco-Santos et al.'s (2018) proposed framework for managing the unintended 
consequences of PMSs 
 
Performance Budgeting 
Rivenbark and Kelly reviewed municipal performance measures in the context of multiple 
accountabilities and process management in their 2006 article “Performance Budgeting in 
Municipal Government.”  They surveyed municipalities to determine their capacity to build 
performance measurement capabilities into the municipal budgeting process and evaluated 
their use during budget development.  The authors used financial, political, and performance 
accountabilities to frame the performance measures discussion and analysis in an interpretivist 
approach.  They defined performance budgeting as the act of using performance results to 
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inform allocation decisions during budget preparation and adoption.  Rivenbark and Kelly 
(2006) defined their methodology to evaluate the level of performance budgeting adoption, 
while normalizing the data for other influences including size of municipality. The outcomes of 
this research indicate that there is wide variability in the implementation of performance 
measures across public administration bodies, but some consistency exists in the adoption 
rates for different internal procedures.  The authors did not address any effect that their 
narrow definition of performance management may have had on the outcomes; as they 
created this new definition for the study it is difficult to compare if these results accurately 
connect to other research or real-world situations.   
 
Alternatively, Charbonneau & Bellavance (2015) performed a statistical analysis of the 
determinants of general, management, budgeting, and reporting uses of performance 
information in the municipal performance management system in Quebec.  Their research had 
no general hypothesis but sought to diagnose potential problems in the implementation and 
use of performance management at the local level.  The research strategy used deductive 
reasoning to evaluate survey results, with survey questions targeted to analyze the depth to 
which participants used performance indicators.  This study aimed to “identify the factors, 
whether uncontrollable or controllable, that account for the uses of performance measurement 
by municipal managers.” The existing provincial performance management system made use of 
fourteen mandatory indicators, but several common services were left out including libraries, 
fire, and police.  The authors used descriptive statistics to analyze the different uses of 
management indicators, with a thorough discussion on the limitations of the data and of 
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previous studies.  Two results are noteworthy.  First, the authors found that indicators were 
used more frequently when they showed encouraging results.  Secondly, the positive influence 
of leadership was not observed for performance management in Quebec.  Other significant 
findings showed that neither municipality population nor budget have a significant association 
with the use of performance management.  This study was well constructed and thoroughly 
implemented.  It revealed some surprising trends, including debunking a connection between 
municipality size and the implementation of performance management.  The study also found 
strong evidence of ‘blame avoidance’ being a strong factor in declining internal performance.  
The authors also thoroughly evaluated the limitations of the study which gave credibility and an 
accurate framework with which to understand the results. 
Research Methodology 
Considering the extensive existing research on PMaS and less extensive research on municipal 
performance, this study will review a sample of Ontario municipalities and compare public 
documents regarding their strategic alignment with financial planning.  While this research 
focuses on two indicators of strategic planning, it is important to note that there are over 250 
annual reporting requirements (AMCTO, 2017) for each municipality in the province, 
demonstrating that municipal performance measurement and management is of interest to the 
province and many regulatory agencies.  Administrators must bear in mind all the requirements 
of every regulatory agency during budget development, and these considerations will be 
reflected financially in budget planning documents.  However, it is the overall strategy of the 
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municipality that guides the allocation of finite resources, therefore the strategic plans, asset 
management plans, and budgets are the guiding documents for these major decisions.   
 
Considering that the size and location of municipalities may have an influence on their 
behaviours, municipalities have been chosen to represent small, medium, and large 
communities in their respective region.  Municipalities were randomly selected from south, 
central, and northern Ontario.  To remove the strategic inter-dependencies and financial 
complexities of two-tier municipalities, only single tier municipalities were selected for this 
study.  While this does remove a significant portion of the total municipal study pool, there are 
173 single-tier out of the total 444 Ontario municipalities, including 32 cities, 23 municipalities, 
28 towns, 85 townships, and 5 villages (AMO, 2020).  This distribution demonstrates there are 
still representative samples within single tier municipal organizations.  Fixed population figures 
were not used as the size selection criteria, as municipal population density is unevenly 
distributed within the province.  The largest cities in the north and south are relatively small 
when compared to cities in the central area including the greater Toronto area.  The following 
municipalities were randomly selected for this study:  
 Small (population) Medium Large  
South Ingersoll (14k) Chatham-Kent (106k) London (426k) 
Central Haldimand (50k) Sudbury (169k) Mississauga (770k) 
North Temiskaming Shores 
(10k) 
Timmins (43k) Thunder Bay (113k) 




(Statistics Canada, 2016) 
Search for relevant documents was completed using both Google searches and the embedded 
search feature of each municipal website.  To ensure consistency among the municipal 
comparators, Asset Management Plans, Strategic Plans, and 2020 Annual Budget documents 
were used as study instruments.  Each document was retrieved from each municipality’s public 
website.  Analysis of these documents demonstrated how effectively some municipalities in 
Ontario are aligning their financial and strategic plans.  By law, all municipalities in Ontario must 
have an Asset Management Plan and published budget documents, but strategic plans are 
optional (aside from Official Plans, which are strategic in nature).  For budget analysis, 2020 
annual budgets were used for all municipalities.  The following documents were used in this 
analysis:  
Table 2: Inventory of documents used for research 
 Asset Management Plan Strategic Plan 
Haldimand 2017 None 
Ingersoll 2016 None 
Temiskaming 2015 2013 - “Municipal Cultural Plan” 
Chatham-Kent 2017 2005 
Sudbury 2016 2019-2027 
Timmins 2019 2011-2020 
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London 2019 2019-2023 
Mississauga 2019 2009 
Thunder Bay 2016 2019-2022 
 
It is important to note that “None” under Strategic Plan in Table 2 does not indicate that the 
municipality has no strategic planning complete; all study municipalities had some department-
specific strategic plans available to the public.  However, these municipalities did not have a 
broad strategic plan governing all strategic decisions.  For example, Haldimand County had a 
section on their website titled “Strategic Plans,” containing two documents: Economic 
Development Strategy and Tourism Action Plan. While both of these documents will guide 
decision making in their respective municipal services, there is still an absence of high-level 
strategic vision.  In contrast, Chatham-Kent’s strategic plan webpage had 281 plans, reports, 
and studies available to the public including an over-arching strategic plan to tie them all 
together.  While many of the Chatham-Kent documents have a very specific focus, such as 
bridge financing or arena business plans, the public presentation of the information as 
“strategic” speaks to the breadth of municipal considerations and gives context to strategic 
decision making.  In the sample municipalities, there was one aberration from the standard 
“Strategic Plan” document in title: Temiskaming Shores titled their strategic plan a “Municipal 
Cultural Plan,”demonstratingtheir strategic pivot from a resource-based economy to a culture-
based economy.  Despite the difference in title, this document was deemed a corporate 
strategic plan for the purpose of this study due to its broad strategic focus. 
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Considering the existing literature and effects of behavioural economics, this analysis will use 
the following key categories (Franco-Santos et al., 2007) to review performance measurement 
systems’ municipal role at the Council level:    
(1) “measure performance” - This category encompasses the role of monitoring progress 
and measuring/evaluating performance;  
(2) “strategy management” - This category comprises the roles of planning, strategy 
formulation, implementation/execution, and organizational alignment;  
(3) “communication” - This comprises the roles of internal and external communication, 
benchmarking and compliance with regulations;  
(4) “influence behaviour” - This category encompasses the roles of rewarding or 
compensating behaviour, managing relationships, and control; and  
(5) “learning and improvement” - This comprises the roles of feedback, double-loop 
learning, and performance improvement. 
Analysis 
The following analysis reviews the public information for the nine randomly selected 
municipalities regarding the links to resource allocation and strategic planning.  Table 3 
identifies six indicators used to evaluate these connections.  Two “budget linking” indicators 
identify whether, through written text or website links, the financial budget information is 
connected in some way to strategic plans.  “Financial allocation” refers to any kind of budget 
breakdown showing the relative fund allocations for tax and/or fee based public services.  
“Service PMaS Information” refers to information showing the planned performance or units of 
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service for public services or allocation areas.  “Individualized costs noted” indicates whether 
there is an individualized breakdown of financial costs, such as “a x% tax increase represents a 
$xx.xx increase to the municipal tax bill for an average home valued at $xxx,xxx” or fee 
examples, such as “a x.x% increase to fees moves next year’s public swim costs to $x.xx.”  This 
type of information adds individual cost context so that an individual tax- or fee-payer can put 
the change in their own financial context.  This allows them to contextualize the financial 
change in terms of financial losses or gains compared to service delivery; service delivery should 
be assumed to be equivalent for comparison purposes but was more often than not unstated.    
“Individualized gains noted” is similar in meaning but is an indicator of what service 
improvements an individual tax- or rate-payer may gain in their personal context.  Please 
remember that for this research, two-tier municipalities have been excluded to simplify the 
sample pool and variables.  However, there may be differing trends in this excluded sample set 
that would differ from these results; further research could verify similarities or differences.  
Table 3 summarizes the analysis of asset management plans, strategic plans, financial allocation 
information, service PMaS information, individualized costs, individualized gains, and the 
identified indicators for each sample municipality.   
   
 
   
 
Table 3: Analysis of strategy and performance links to budget in 6 Ontario municipalities 



















gains noted Example Indicators 
Ingersoll Small South No No Yes No Yes No Primarily financial information presented 
Haldimand Small Central Yes No Yes No Yes No Primarily financial information presented 
Temiskaming Small North No No Yes No No No Financial information only 
Chatham-
Kent Medium South Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
"Council Priorities" strategic 
link to financial allocations 
Sudbury Medium Central Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Strategic links: business 
cases, public "budget 
allocator" to set their own 
priorities, service 
benchmarking report, annual 
BMA comparative study (9 
years), municipal 
benchmarking network 
(MBN Can), monthly 
performance dashboards 
Timmins Medium North Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Most recent FIR and MPMP 
data published, but MPMP 
out of date.   
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London Large South Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Strategic plan not linked on 
website but mentioned 37 
times in budget report; 
business cases used to link 
financial costs of strategic 
initiatives; some for cost 
savings initiatives, others 
justify new or changed 
programs. London's strategic 
plan dashboard shows PMaS 
information for the top level 
of leadership 
Mississauga Large Central Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Strategic links using business 
cases; budget allocator tool 
with no tie to actual service 
levels; Strategic Plan does 
have item completion 
tracker.  Budget executive 
summary listed contextual 
individual gains to users, 
such as transit use, new 
community centre, cricket 
pitch, etc. 
Thunder Bay Large North Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Budget lists specific local 
improvements to sidewalks, 
storm water, roads, parks, 
lighting, linked to AMP.   
   
 
   
 
The size of municipality in this study shows some level of development or maturation toward 
linking strategic plans to financial plans. .  By law, all municipalities must have financial budgets 
and asset management plans published.  This research supports an assumption that resourcing 
available at larger municipalities may allow increased depth to strategic planning that smaller 
municipalities may not be able to pursue; 78% of the municipalities in this study linked their 
budget to their asset management plan.  All of the large and medium municipalities in the study 
link their asset management plans to their financial budgets, and most to their strategic plans.  
Small municipalities tended to present the budget as a stand-alone financial plan.  As to spatial 
distribution, a clear pattern of linking finances to strategic plans does not emerge, while 
acknowledging that the sample size is also too small to offer any statistically significant spatial 
analysis.  All of the central municipalities and two-thirds of the north and south regions 
connected their budget to their asset management plans.   
 
As to spatial distribution of strategic plan links (Table 4), 56% of the municipalities made the 
budget link to their strategic plan; two-thirds in both south and central regions, and one-third in 
the north.  Total indicators based on spatial distribution indicate that there could be more links 
to strategic planning and information that could compensate for loss aversion in the central and 
south areas (central 72%, north 50%, south 66%).   
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Table 4: Spatial distribution of link indicators 
Values Central North South 
Grand 
Total 
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 3 2 2 7 
Sum of Website or document linking SP 2 1 2 5 
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 3 3 3 9 
Sum of Service PMaS Information 0 0 2 2 
Sum of Individualized costs noted 3 2 3 8 
Sum of Individualized gains noted 2 1 0 3 
Total # 13 9 12  
Total % 72% 50% 66%  
     
 
Population distribution (Table 5) shows similar trends to spatial distribution; areas with higher 
populations show more links between financial and strategic planning.  This study shows that 
larger cities make more links between financial and strategic planning, and also provide 
information that could compensate for the effects of loss aversion: large 83%, medium 72%, 
small 33%.   
 
Table 5: Population distribution of link indicators 
Values Large Medium Small 
Grand 
Total 
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 3 3 1 7 
Sum of Website or document linking SP 3 2 0 5 
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 3 3 3 9 
Sum of Service PMaS Information 1 1 0 2 
Sum of Individualized costs noted 3 3 2 8 
Sum of Individualized gains noted 2 1 0 3 
Total # 15 13 6  
Total % 83% 72% 33%  
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Table 6 summarizes the distribution matrix by population and area for each factor, with sums 
following for all factors.   
 




Considering this new data and the existing literature, several observations can be made in line 
with existing research.  Otley & Barry (1980) note that actors or managers may have important 
Row Labels Large Medium Small 
Grand 
Total 
Central     
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Website or document linking SP 1 1 0 2 
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Service PMaS Information 0 0 0 0 
Sum of Individualized costs noted 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Individualized gains noted 1 1 0 2 
North     
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 1 1 0 2 
Sum of Website or document linking SP 1 0 0 1 
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Service PMaS Information 0 0 0 0 
Sum of Individualized costs noted 1 1 0 2 
Sum of Individualized gains noted 1 0 0 1 
South     
Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 1 1 0 2 
Sum of Website or document linking SP 1 1 0 2 
Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Service PMaS Information 1 1 0 2 
Sum of Individualized costs noted 1 1 1 3 
Sum of Individualized gains noted 0 0 0 0 
Total Sum of Website or document cross-linking AMP 3 3 1 7 
Total Sum of Website or document linking SP 3 2 0 5 
Total Sum of General Financial Allocation Information 3 3 3 9 
Total Sum of Service PMaS Information 1 1 0 2 
Total Sum of Individualized costs noted 3 3 2 8 
Total Sum of Individualized gains noted 2 1 0 3 
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distinctions in their understanding of mental or explicit models.  This difference may cause 
them to use control mechanisms differently.  Franco-Santos et al. (2018) proposed that “PM(a)S 
types will maximize the fit between the chosen control mechanism and the existing 
organizational conditions,” considering Merton’s (1936) “purposeful actions” and Bedford et 
al.’s (2016) directive or enabling foci.  Municipal strategic plans should clarify goal alignment 
and goal certainty, including identifying environmental characteristics that could affect goal 
uncertainty (Broadbent and Laughlin 2009).  Looking at the data, municipalities that clarify their 
goals through their strategic and budget plans enable their municipal administrators to use a 
stewardship-based approach.  Smaller municipalities with limited financial links to strategy will 
drive their administrators to agency-focused approaches.   This is not to say that one or another 
approach is superior; contingency research by Chenhall (2003) and Otley (2016) supports that 
one approach may not be universal across organizations.  This contingency approach further 
supports the development of municipal strategic plans rooted in local culture and context.  
However, based on the regulatory framework within which municipalities operate, they likely 
have much more in common than they have differences.   
 
As municipal leaders are chosen from their local population to representatively make 
judgements and decisions on issues, municipal strategic planning emerges as the critical tool to 
engage citizens in priority setting to provide what they deem as the most appropriate public 
good to maintain the community that they envision.  This citizen-driven strategy is the basis for 
democracy, and is further supported by servant leadership theory (Parris, 2012).   
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Strategy Management 
Neoliberalism and capitalist business strategy are brought to mind as claims that government 
should be “run like a business.”  While this may be suggested to mean government needs to be 
financially “lean,” it also supports the assertion that strategic planning is crucial in order for 
municipalities to remain as strategically focused as a business enterprise would be.  
Contextually, many of the largest private businesses in the world have less-than-majority 
market shares; municipalities’ complex strategies are fundamentally different from businesses 
in the way that citizens or customers can self-select their services.  Municipal strategy is about 
focusing limited resources on what will benefit citizens the most - having a strategy and 
measuring performance is key.  Citizens living in municipalities with a published strategic plan 
will have less difficulty understanding their municipality’s intentions.  However, the majority of 
this study’s municipalities (77%) published no performance measurement data tied to their 
strategic plans.  In addition, the strategic plans were on a multi-year cycle while budgets in all 
municipalities are approved annually.  Citizens should know at least annually if the efforts of 
the municipality, including the budget, are working towards and meeting the organization’s 
goals.  It is key that the PMaS and PMeS are synchronized so that resource allocation and 
performance reporting can be made at complementary intervals.   
 
If these systems are out of synchronization, what drives municipal strategy? The province 
mandates financial reporting and asset management plans, their scope, and reporting intervals, 
and many more details.  This ensures that municipalities do not lose control of their financial 
obligations and therefore impact the finances of the province.  This research indicates that 
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smaller municipalities in Ontario, irrespective of general location develop strategic plans less 
frequently than higher populated comparators.  While this could be due to the smaller financial 
or staff resources of these municipalities, it also could be driven by other environmental 
factors.  Municipal councillors in small municipalities represent relatively small numbers of 
constituents and often smaller physical jurisdictions; this lack of published strategic planning 
may only indicate that these smaller municipalities do not require a plan as the elected 
representatives may have a deeper knowledge and understanding of local issues, and the 
breadth of issues may be limited by local environmental factors.  However, if this is true, it is 
still subject to the myopic limitations of the four-year election cycle.  
Communication 
Communication of all of the strategic information is key to understanding performance success.  
One could argue that this study primarily analyzes the effectiveness of strategy communication, 
and not the prevalence or interconnectedness of strategy itself.  As local leaders, municipal 
administrations need to communicate their plans and report their results to be held 
appropriately accountable.  Clear communication of plans and results will minimize the 
tendency towards gaming, such as setting easily achievable results.   The positive aspects of 
communication have already been discussed in the Measurement Performance and Strategy 
Management sections earlier.  There is one key element of communication that is infrequently 
found in this study: while individualized costs are common among study municipalities, 
individualized gains are much less frequently published.  Eighty-nine percent of study 
municipalities published individualized costs such as “xx% tax increase per household”, while 
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only 33% attempted to individualize gains.  As previously noted, losses are much more acutely 
felt than gains so it is imperative for municipalities to demonstrate the cost benefit to the 
citizen, even as far as doubling the effort in demonstrating gains to mitigate loss aversion 
effects.   
Influence Behaviour 
Beyond loss aversion, municipal councils are democratically incentivized to please the majority 
of their stakeholders, or at least voters, and the primary information about their performance is 
published by their own organization.  The democratic importance of framing performance could 
easily lead to gaming and the setting of easily accomplished tasks to present regular ‘wins’ to 
the public (Merchant, 1990).  In contrast, the strategic planning process undermines these 
negative incentives by planning and publishing the goals at the outset of a planning period.  
While this does not remove any political calculus involved in public opinion and re-election 
strategy, it tips the scales in favour of public transparency.  While this study focused on the 
main drivers of costs and strategy in Ontario municipalities, these are not the only anchors that 
the public has to measure municipal performance.  Learning and improvement are the final 
outcomes of effective performance management systems.   
Learning & Improvement 
Finally, learning and organizational improvement are a key output of effective PMaS and should 
be an output of an effective strategy, performance management subsystems, and ultimately 
municipal electoral accountability.  All of the subject municipalities that published strategic 
  46 
 
plans noted a planning horizon and planning cycle; this is crucial to keep the strategy and 
related resource allocations relevant to the community over time.  Community cultures vary for 
many reasons, and can change over time and due to forces within or without – all requiring 
learning and improvement highlighted in the strategic plans and asset management plans.  All 
plans followed a contingency style, shaping the plan to the community’s vision, desires, 
environment, and resources.  
Conclusion 
This research has revealed some clear links and patterns in budget allocations and strategic 
planning in several representative Ontario municipalities.  While each plan or budget may be 
considered a control system in its own right (Ferreira and Otley 2009; Malmi and Brown 2008; 
Otley 1999), the importance of linking the multiplicity of municipal plans and strategies to finite 
resources remains clear. All documents must be “tightly connected” (Otley 2016, Weich 1976) 
to effectively deliver services to the public and remain accountable.  The province and its 
regulatory bodies prescribe bounds and directives to municipalities and enable them through 
the Municipal Act (2001) and other acts to carry out these duties, but it is clear that 
municipalities use more than one way to accomplish these tasks.  Municipalities will benefit by 
linking their multiple plans and initiatives under one strategic plan to ensure matching 
prioritization to finite resources.  This matching will also allow the public to better frame their 
decisions to ensure wise use of resources and to elect responsive and responsible 
representatives.  Limited strategy will drive service providers to directive or agency-based 
systems and may lead to Procrustean budgeting when perspectives are disconnected or 
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myopic.  In the absence of a strategic plan, the municipal budget becomes the primary strategic 
tool.  In these situations, it is crucial for decision makers to understand their environment and 
the behavioural economics related to the budget as a performance management system. 
Municipalities deliver a wide variety of services that make performance management 
complicated, but this should be the driver to ensure performance is managed transparently, 
rather than letting loss aversion lead strategy.  While municipalities are ‘creatures of the 
province,’ they have their own elected officials and processes for political accountability.  There 
is no one set of values for any municipality or Ontarian; the municipal political system must be 
leveraged effectively by linking finance, strategy, and politics to provide municipally and 
culturally relevant local services to citizens.  
 
  
  48 
 
Bibliography 
Arce, P. C., Holzhacker, M., Mahlendorf, M. D., & Matějka, M. (2017). Relative performance 
evaluation and the ratchet effect. Contemporary Accounting Research, doi:10.1111/1911-
3846.12385 
 




AMO – Association of Municipalities Ontario. (2017).  Ontario Municipalities – List.  Retrieved 
from: http://www.amo.on.ca/AMO-Content/Municipal-101/Ontario-Municipalities.aspx 
 
Baert, P. (1991). Unintended consequences: a typology and examples. International Sociology, 
6, pp. 201–210. 
 
Bedford, D.S., Malmi, T. and Sandelin, M. (2016). Management control effectiveness and 
strategy: an empirical analysis of packages and systems. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 
51, pp. 12–28. 
 
Berliner, J.S. (1956). A problem in Soviet business administration. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 1, pp. 86–101. 
 
Bevan, G. and Hood, C. (2006). What’s measured is what matters: targets and gaming in the 
English public health care system. Public Administration, 84, pp. 517–538. 
 
Bonner, S.E. and Sprinkle, G.B. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task 
performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, pp. 303–345. 
 
Broadbent, J. and Laughlin, R. (2009). Performance management systems: a conceptual model. 
Management Accounting Research, 20, pp. 283–295. 
 
Cardella, E., & Depew, B. (2018). Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-
effort work task. Games and Economic Behavior, 107, 182-202. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.005 
 
Cardinaels, E. and Yin, H. (2015). Think twice before going for incentives: social norms and the 
principal’s decision on compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research, 53, pp. 985–
1015. 
 
Carmeli, A. (2006). The managerial skills of the top management team and the performance of 
municipal organisations. Local Government Studies, 32(2), 153-176. 
doi:10.1080/03003930600586159 
  49 
 
 
Charbonneau, É., & Bellavance, F. (2015). Performance management in a benchmarking regime: 
Quebec's municipal management indicators. Canadian Public Administration, 58(1), 110-137. 
doi:10.1111/capa.12098 
 
Charness, G., Kuhn, P., & Villeval, M. C. (2011). Competition and the ratchet effect. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 29(3), 513-547. doi:10.1086/659347 
 
Chatham-Kent, Municipality of. (2020). Final Budget by Business Unit.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.chatham-kent.ca/local-government/financial-information/Budget/2020-budget 
 









Chenhall, R.H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational context: 
findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, 
Organizations & Society, 28, pp. 127– 168. 
 
Chwastiak, M. (2006). Rationality, performance measures and representations of reality: 
planning, programming and budgeting and the Vietnam war. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 17, pp. 29–55. 
 
Conrad, L. and Guven Uslu, P. (2012). UK health sector performance management: conflict, 
crisis and unintended consequences. Accounting Forum, 36, pp. 231–250. 
 
Cox, A. (2005). The outcomes of variable pay systems: tales of multiple costs and unforeseen 
consequences. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16, pp. 1475–1497. 
 
Cuguero-Escofet, N. and Rosanas, J.M. (2016). The ethics of ´ metrics: overcoming the 
dysfunctional effects of performance measurements through justice. Journal of Business Ethics, 
140, pp. 615–631. 
 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22, pp. 20–47. 
 
Drucker, P.F. (1954), The Practice of Management, Harper and Row Publishers, Inc, New York, 
NY. 
  50 
 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Journal, 14, pp. 57–74. 
 
Elias, N. (1997). Towards a theory of social processes: a translation. British Journal of Sociology, 
48, pp. 355– 383. 
 
Elias, N. (1998). The Norbert Elias Reader, eds J. Goudsblom, S. Mennell, E. Jephcott, R. van 
Krieken, J. Goudsblom and S. Mennel (trans). Malden, NJ: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Ferreira, A. and Otley, D.T. (2009). The design and use of performance management systems: 
an extended framework for analysis. Management Accounting Research, 20, pp. 263–282. 
 
Fitzgerald, L. (1988), “Management performance measurement in service industries”, 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 109-16. 
 
Franco-Santos, M. and Doherty, N. (2017). Performance management and well-being: a close 
look at the changing nature of the UK higher education workplace. International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 28, pp. 2319–2350. 
 
Franco-Santos, M., Kennerley, M., Micheli, P., Martinez, V., Mason, S., Marr, B., Gray, D., & 
Neely, A. (2007). Towards a definition of a business performance measurement 
system. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 27(8), 784–801. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570710763778 
 
Franco-Santos, M. and Otley, D. (2018). Reviewing and theorizing the unintended consequences 
of performance management systems: unintended consequences of PMS. International Journal 
of Management Reviews, 20(3), 696-730. doi:10.1111/ijmr.12183 
 
Franco-Santos, M., Rivera, P. and Bourne, M. (2014). Performance Management in UK Higher 
Education Institutions. London: Leadership Foundation for Higher Education. 
 
Friedrich, P.  & Eerma, D. (2018). Public Value under Chaotic Conditions. Eesti 
majanduspoliitilised väitlused, 25(2). https://doi.org/10.15157/tpep.v25i2.13971 
 
Gabris, G. (1992). Strategic Planning in Municipal Government: A Tool for Expanding 
Cooperative Decision Making between Elected and Appointed Officials. Public Productivity & 
Management Review, 16(1), 77-93. doi:10.2307/3380807 
 
Gersbach, H., & Glazer, A. (2009). High compensation creates a ratchet effect. The Economic 
Journal, 119(539), 1208-1224. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02256.x 
 
  51 
 
Ghalayini, A.M. and Noble, J.S. (1996), “The changing basis of performance measurement”, 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 16 No. 8, pp. 63-80. 
 
Goold, M. and Quinn, J.J. (1990), “The paradox of strategic controls”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 43-57. 
 
Haldimand, County of.  (2020). Tax Supported Operating Budget. Retrieved from: 
https://www.haldimandcounty.ca/document-category/budgets/  
 




Haldimand, County of. (2020). Strategic Plans (Multiple).  Retrieved from: 
https://www.haldimandcounty.ca/strategic-plans/ 
 
Healy, P. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 7, pp. 85–107. 
 
Hernandez, M. (2012). Toward an understanding of the psychology of stewardship. Academy of 
Management Review, 37, pp. 172–193. 
 
Heukelom, F. (2009). Kahneman and Tversky and the making of behavioral economics. Erasmus 
Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2(1), 161. doi:10.23941/ejpe.v2i1.36 
 
Hood, C. (2006). Gaming in targetworld: The targets approach to managing british public 
services. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 515-521. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00612.x 
 
Hopwood, A.G. (1972). An empirical study of the role of accounting data in performance 
evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 10, pp. 156–182. 
 
Ingersoll, Town of.  (2020) 2020 Budget – Final. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ingersoll.ca/download/2020-budget-final/ 
 





ISO (Internatoinal Organization for Standardization), 2020.  ISO-ISO 37120: 2018 Sustainable 
cities and communities – Indicators for city services and quality of life.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.iso.org/standard/68498.html 
 
  52 
 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305– 360. 
 
Johnson, H.T. and Kaplan, R.S. (1987), Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management 
Accounting, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1972). "Subjective probability: A judgment of 
representativeness" (PDF). Cognitive Psychology. 3 (3): 430–454. doi:10.1016/0010-
0285(72)90016-3. 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 
103(3), 582-591. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., Thaler, R. (2004). From psychology to behavioral finance: blizzards 
and basketball tickets. Journal of Financial Planning, 17(8), 13. 
 
Kerpershoek, E., Groenleer, M. and de Bruijn, H. (2016). Unintended responses to performance 
management in Dutch hospital care: bringing together the managerial and professional 
perspectives. Public Management Review, 18, pp. 417–436. 
 
Khalil, E. L. (2013). Practical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization. Theory and 
Decision, 74(1), 107-126. doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z 
 
Li, J. (2015). The paradox of performance regimes: strategic responses to target regimes in 
Chinese local government. Public Administration, 93, pp. 1152–1167. 
 
Lindsay, C., Osborne, S.P. and Bond, S. (2014). The ‘new public governance’ and employability 
services in an era of crisis: challenges for third sector organizations in Scotland. Public 
Administration, 92, pp. 192–207. 
 
London, City of. (2020). Budget. Retrieved from: https://london.ca/sites/default/files/2020-
10/Approved_2020-2023_Tax_Supported_Budget.pdf 
 
London, City of. (2020). Strategic Plan. Retrieved from: https://london.ca/government/council-
civic-administration/master-plans-strategies/plans-strategies 
 




Lowe, E.A. and Shaw, R.W. (1968). An analysis of managerial biasing: evidence from a 
company’s budgeting process. Journal of Management Studies, 5, pp. 304–315. 
 
  53 
 
Magnusson, W. (2005). Are Municipalities Creatures of the Provinces? Journal of Canadian 
Studies, 39(2), 5–29. https://doi.org/10.1353/jcs.2006.0019 
 
Malmi, T. and Brown, D.A. (2008). Management control systems as a package – opportunities, 
challenges and research directions. Management Accounting Research, 19, pp. 287–300. 
 
Mannion, R. and Braithwaite, J. (2012). Unintended consequences of performance 
measurement in healthcare: 20 salutary lessons from the English National Health Service. 
Internal Medicine Journal, 42, pp. 569–74. 
 
McCann, L., Granter, E., Hassard, J. and Hyde, P. (2015). ‘You can’t do both – something will 
give’: limitations of the targets culture in managing UK health care workforces. Human 
Resource Management, 54, pp. 773–791. 
 
Mennell, S. (1977). ‘Individual’ action and its ‘social’ consequences in the work of Nobert Elias. 
In Human Figurations. Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, pp. 99–109. 
 
Merchant, K.A. (1990). The effects of financial controls on data manipulation and management 
myopia. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15, pp. 297–313. 
 
Merton, R.K. (1936). The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. American 
Sociological Review, 1, pp. 894–904. 
 
Mica, A., Peisert, A. and Winczorek, J. (2011). Sociology and the Unintended: Robert Merton 
Revisited. Bern: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften. 
 
Mississauga, City of.  (2020). 2020 Budget.  Retrieved from: 
https://web.mississauga.ca/council/budget-and-finances/city-of-mississauga-budget/ 
 
Mississauga, City of (2020).  Strategic Plan and Action Plan.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.mississauga.ca/projects-and-strategies/strategies-and-plans/strategic-plan/ 
 




Otley, D. (1999). Performance management: a framework for management control systems 
research. Management Accounting Research, 10, pp. 363–382. 
 
Otley, D. (2016). The contingency theory of management accounting and control. Management 
Accounting Research, 31, pp. 45–62. 
 
  54 
 
Otley, D., Association, M., & Soin, K. (2014). Management Control and Uncertainty. 
In Management Control and Uncertainty. Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137392121 
 
Otley, D.T. and Berry, A.J. (1980). Control, organisation and accounting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 5, pp. 231–244. 
 
Parris, P. (2012). A Systematic Literature Review of Servant Leadership Theory in Organizational 
Contexts. Journal of Business Ethics, 113(3), 377–393. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-
1322-6 
 
Portes, A. (2000). The hidden abode: sociology as analysis of the unexpected. American 
Sociological Review, 65, pp. 1–18. 
 
Pressman, S. (2006). Kahneman, Tversky, and institutional economics. Journal of Economic 
Issues, 40(2), 501-506. doi:10.1080/00213624.2006.11506929 
 
Rick, S. (2011). Losses, gains, and brains: Neuroeconomics can help to answer open questions 
about loss aversion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21(4), 453-463. 
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2010.04.004 
 
Rivenbark, W. C., & Kelly, J. M. (2006). Performance budgeting in municipal government. Public 
Performance & Management Review, 30(1), 35-46. doi:10.2753/PMR1530-9576300102 
 
Rubin, I. (1993). Who Invented Budgeting in the United States? Public Administration 
Review, 53(5), 438-444. doi:10.2307/976344 
 
Shepherd, D.A. and Suddaby, R. (2017). Theory building: a review and integration. Journal of 
Management, 43, pp. 59–86. 
Simon, Herbert A., 1957b, Models of Man, New York: John Wiley. 
 
Smith, A. (1759). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London: Printed for A. Millar; and A. Kincaid 
and J. Bell. 
 
Smith, P. (1995a). On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the 
public sector. International Journal of Public Administration, 18, pp. 277–310. 
 




  55 
 
Stout, L. (2012). The shareholder value myth: how putting shareholders first harms investors, 
corporations, and the public. In The shareholder value myth (1st ed.). Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, Inc. 
 
Sudbury, City of. (2020). 2020 Budget.  Retrieved from: https://www.greatersudbury.ca/city-
hall/budget-and-finance/2020-budget/ 
 
Sudbury, City of. (2020) Strategic plans (Multiple).  Retrieved from: 
https://www.greatersudbury.ca/city-hall/reports-studies-policies-and-plans/ 
 




Tan, K.H. and Rae, R.H. (2009). Uncovering the links between regulation and performance 
measurement. International Journal of Production Economics, 122, pp. 449– 457. 
 
Temiskaming, Town of. (2015).  Asset Management Plan.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.temiskamingshores.ca/en/city-hall/resources/PublicWorks/Asset/AMP-2015.pdf 
 





Temiskaming, Town of (2020). 2020 Budget Approval Minutes.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.temiskamingshores.ca/uploads/38/Doc_637202108657829897.pdf 
 
Thaler, R. H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., & Schwartz, A. (1997). The effect of myopia and loss 
aversion on risk taking: An experimental test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 647-
661. doi:10.1162/003355397555226 
 
Timmins, City of. (2020). 2020 Budget.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.timmins.ca/cms/One.aspx?portalId=11976429&pageId=13194267 
 
Timmins, City of. (2020). Asset Maagement Policy.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.timmins.ca/cms/One.aspx?portalId=11976429&pageId=13194267 
 
Timmins, City of (2020) Strategic Plan.  Retrieved from: http://www.timmins2020.ca/;  
http://www.timmins2020.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/T2020-FULL-Final-Report.pdf 
 
  56 
 








Thunder Bay, City of.  (2020). Municipal Budget.  Retrieved from: 
https://getinvolvedthunderbay.ca/citybudget 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent 
model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061. doi:10.2307/2937956 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323. doi:10.1007/BF00122574 
 
Waddington, I. (2016). Theorising unintended consequences of anti-doping policy. Performance 
Enhancement & Health, 4, pp. 80–87. 
 
Weick, K.E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 21, pp. 1-19. 
 
Weick, E. (1989). Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy of Management 
Review, 14, pp. 516– 531. 
 
